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Abstract
We analyze the ECB Governing Council’s voting procedures. The literature has by now 
discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many 
institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization 
scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of 
these gaps. First, we integrate speciﬁ  c preferences of national central bank presi-
dents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power 
of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at 
every relevant point in time separately.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: D72, D78, E58
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1.  Introduction 
In the ECB Governing Council (GC), the monetary policy decision body of the ECB, each of 
the currently 22 (6 members of the Executive Board and 16 Presidents of the Central Banks of 
the euro area) members is treated equally in voting situations according to the “one member-
one vote” rule. Although the decisions are supposed to be made following a simple majority 
rule, until today they are said to be taken unanimously (Servais, 2006). But the growing 
heterogeneity of an ever enlarging euro area could well put an end to this tradition. The 
perspective of a euro area enlargement to the current border of the EU countries and of the 
GC to 33 members has enforced the necessity of a reform of its voting modalities, aiming to 
enable the GC to decide timely and efficiently about ECB’s monetary policy. The European 
Council of 21 March 2003 has modified the relevant Article 10.2 of the statutes of the 
Eurosystem in favour of an ECB’s reform proposal, the so-called rotation model. According 
to these changes (and later decisions), the rotation of voting rights in the CG model will set in 
with euro area enlargement to 19 members. Then, the number of votes allotted to national 
representatives will be reduced to 15, while leaving 6 votes to the Executive Board. 
Any assessment of the rotation model comes along with the question whether it 
ensures that the ECB’s main decision body can act efficiently and in the interest of the whole 
currency area. It has frequently been claimed that the exchange of opinions among 21 
members might already be too time-consuming for a monetary policy decision body that 
meets twice a month, especially if all 33 members are allowed to be present and to speak in 
the meetings (Belke, 2003; Gros, 2003). However, this caveat shall not be central in this 
study. The second question concerning the effectiveness of GC’s monetary policy relates to a 
fear of renationalisation of ECB’s monetary policy due to the heterogeneity of its growing 
number of members. The latter question is frequently linked to the assessment of the role of 
the Executive Board (EB) in a reformed GC. Its members are elected as European experts on 
the European but not on the national level. While there is some theoretical evidence for a 
national bias in the voting behaviour of the National Central Bank (NCB) governors,
1 the 
members of EB are frequently supposed to take a purely European perspective.
2 Nevertheless, 
some studies support the view that the charges for the rotation model are to the account of the 
Executive Board (Widgrén, 2008; Fahrholz/ Mohl, 2006), whereas other studies identify a 
                                                 
1 For instance, Meade/ Sheets (2005) show that there exists some regional bias in the voting pattern of the 
members of the Federal Open Market Committee.  
2 See, for instance, Belke/ Styczynska (2006) and Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009). -5- 
 
strengthening of its role (Belke/ Styczynska, 2006; Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch, 2009; Kosior et 
al., 2008). In the present study, we re-examine this question in the context of a power index 
analysis. We construct a model which is novel in several aspects. First, we are able to 
consider the details on the precise form of the rotation published only recently (ECB, 2009). 
Thanks to them, we avoid the average view taken in several game theoretical studies and 
report power indices for separate voting events. Second, we will explicitly model the 
preferences of all members of the GC. Finally, we will account for the role of the ECB 
president as the agenda-setter.  
In our analysis, we use the preference-based power index approach originally 
proposed by Passarelli/ Barr (2007). In general, power indices measure the potential influence 
of a player on the outcome of a game or, expressed differently, the probability that a player 
determines its outcome. This is usually formalised by the expected marginal contribution of 
the player to a random coalition of players established before his arrival. While symmetric 
values like the Shapley-Shubik index only account for the number of players in the random 
coalitions, quasi-values like the preference-based index by Passarelli/ Barr (2007) 
accommodate alternative randomization schemes. Based on the multilinear extension of 
games (Owen, 1977), Passarelli/ Barr (2007) develop a power measure based on two 
assumptions: (1) the distance between a player’s political position and the discussed issue 
determines his probability of voting “yes”; (2) the swinging votes of players in votes about 
highly likely issues are weighted higher in the power index than those in less likely issues. 
The resulting value enables the consideration of the players’ and an agenda-setter’s 
preferences. 
With this approach we further pursuit and even extend the way taken in Belke/ 
Styczynska (2006) and analyse the GC’s voting as a cooperative game. We feel legitimized to 
argue that this view displays the characteristics of the voting situation in this monetary 
committee in an appropriate way, which accounts for both the collegial character as well as 
some degree of partisan behaviour. By the collegial character, we mean the claim that NCB 
governors take part in GC meetings as equal experts who do not focus on the national but on 
the European perspective. This point of view is always emphasized by the official statements 
by ECB officials but is also reflected in the tradition of informal meetings (on the eve of 
every GC meeting), as well as in the “one member-one vote” principle (which is still in force 
today and will remain so until the accession of the 19
th euro area member). At the same time, 
most studies consider a regional bias in the governors’ voting behaviour as a not too -6- 
 
unrealistic scenario (Bindseil 2001; Heinemann/ Hüfner 2004; Fahrholz/ Mohl 2008; Ullrich 
2004; Schulze 2005; Bénassy-Quéré 2009). Starting from a study by Meade/ Sheets (2005), 
some other studies also consider a regional bias in the voting behaviour of the EB’s members 
(Ullrich 2004; Kosior et al. 2008). Because of the contradictions between the ECB’s wording 
and the results of the studies, a cooperative modelling of the “voting game” which explicitly 
accounts for individual preferences is highly indicative and should come to interesting results.  
As far as the preferences of national central bank presidents (NBPs) are concerned, we 
have decided to go beyond many studies and to consider a broader measure of 
macroeconomic divergence than merely regarding inflation preferences of the member states. 
This is made possible by the approach of Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009). The authors 
simulate desired interest rates of NBPs by the Taylor rule and, thus, enable us to take different 
country-specific preferences for inflation into account. This method can be seen as a good 
approximation of future preferences of NBPs, and represents the future macroeconomic 
developments better than past inflation rates. In the approach of Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch 
(2009), the median voter concept is used to simulate the decision making. One of the results is 
an outstanding influence of the Executive Board. The authors observe that the EB always 
takes a median position in the political space. This pattern increases its measured influence as 
compared to the influence measured by classical power indices. In our analysis, we fully 
account for the position of all actors in the political space. We are also able to consider a 
further important characteristic of the EB, i.e. its agenda-setting power. It will be shown that 
the advantageous position of the EB on the policy space together with its agenda-setting 
power results in an outstanding position of the EB in the GC in terms of power indices. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. In Section 3, the new ECB rotation model is described in detail. In section 4, the 
theoretical model and the setup of our calculations are presented. We come up with our 
empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 finally concludes. 
 
 
2.  Review of the relevant literature 
Decision making in monetary policy committees is subject of a fast growing branch of 
literature. There exist approaches that develop optimal designs from a theoretical point of 
view as well as assessments of existing decision rules. The optimal design of a monetary 
policy committee includes a definition of the optimal size, composition and voting rule -7- 
 
(Gerling et al. 2003). As it is out of question by now that the rotation model will not be 
modified, and our analysis concentrates on an assessment of this rule, we will focus on the 
studies that also analyse the rotation model with the power index concept.  
Until today, there exist only a few studies that analyse the power allocation in the ECB 
GC (e.g. Belke/ Styczynska, 2004 and 2006; Fahrholz/ Mohl, 2006 and Ullrich, 2004, Kosior 
et al., 2008). While Belke/ Styczynska (2004 and 2006) and Fahrholz/ Mohl (2004, 2006 and 
2008) pursuit different ways of analysis, Ullrich’s (2004) research is based upon the method 
presented in the firstly noted publication. There, an inter-temporal approach has been chosen 
in order to visualise the effect of the planned reform of the ECB GC, without any knowledge 
of the precise rotation modalities, which have been announced in December 2008.
3 One of the 
important assumptions there is that NBPs form coalitions that are persistent over time. These 
coalitions are not necessarily identical with the groups that define the voting frequencies. The 
intuitive idea is that NBP tend to agree upon a voting in which the interest of each coalition 
member is represented even though only some hold the voting right in a precise moment of 
time. Then, relative voting frequencies can be interpreted as voting weights in an inter-
temporal game.
4 As a consequence the resulting power indices are not values of players in an 
exact moment of time, but average values over time.
5 This aspect of the study has been 
frequently criticised (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch, 2009; Kosior et al., 2008) because the 
average consideration always leads to a loss of information. We will fully account for this 
critique in this study and only analyse single points of time and base our conclusions on a 
comparison of single voting situations rather than on averaging.  
Ullrich (2004) also chooses the inter-temporal view in her voting power analysis. 
Using this method, she analyses the discrepancy between the political weight of NBPs and the 
economic weight of their countries of origin. In contrast to these two analyses, Fahrholz/ 
Mohl (2004, 2006 and 2008) choose other possibilities to apply the power index concept to 
                                                 
3 ECB (2009). 
4 We do not follow Fahrholz/ Mohl (2006 and 2008) in their negative assessment of the inter-temporal approach. 
They construct an example which is supposed to demonstrate the disutility of, for instance, the approach taken 
by Belke/ Styczynska (2006). For this purpose, they include a player in the game who has some minor voting 
power (he can be pivotal in few coalitions) but is a dummy as far as the frequency of voting is concerned. 
Unfortunately, this example has a major drawback. Every player that is pivotal in at least one permutation needs 
to take part in the voting game, and consequently has a strictly positive voting frequency. In this case, the 
addition of such a player would lead to a shift in the relative voting weights of all other players already by 
definition of these weights and hence result in a re-apportionment of power indices. If, on the contrary, a player 
was a dummy in terms of frequency voting, he would never take part in the game and could never exert pivotal 
influence on a coalition. Consequently, Fahrholz/ Mohl’s conclusions are internally inconsistent.  
5 This holds because of the additivity property of the Shapley-Shubik index. -8- 
 
the rotation model. In their first attempt to calculate the power indices in the GC under 
rotation, they model each group of players as a coalition (Fahrholz/ Mohl 2004)
6. This 
assumption unfortunately neither accounts for the influence of a single player nor for the 
typical characteristics of rotation where time is one of the relevant variables. Behind this 
modelling, the strong assumption of every group acting like a coalition is hidden, which can 
be doubted especially in the most heterogeneous group two. In a further attempt to assess the 
rotation model (Fahrholz/ Mohl 2006 und 2008) the authors construct a game in which every 
NBP has one vote while the EB is considered as one player with 6 votes. They compute so-
called preliminary Banzhaf indices for this game and weight the result with the absolute 
voting frequencies. Already from this description, it can be followed that this approach does 
not account for the characteristics of the rotation either. This voting game which forms the 
basis of further calculations will never take place as such. Consequently, the voting dynamics 
captured by the Banzhaf indices are misleading as they neither represent a concrete allocation 
of voting power nor the average over several meetings like in the approach of Belke/ 
Styczynska (2006).  
A recent study in this field has also been published by the Polish National Bank 
(Kosior, et al. 2008). The authors come to the result that the rotation model strengthens the 
power of the EB, but that this gain in power is lower if preferences of the members of the GC 
are taken into account. This study is similar to the present approach in two important aspects: 
first, like Kosior et al. (2008), we also consider single voting situations as basis for the 
analysis; second, both studies consider the preferences of the members of the GC. 
Nevertheless, both aspects are treated in a different way. While Kosior et al. (2008) report an 
average power index for a large number of meetings, we will consider the power distribution 
for several single points of time. Furthermore, the authors use the information of interest rate 
preferences in order to define pre-coalitions in the GC and calculate the Shapley-Shubik-
index for a committee with several pre-coalitions and single players. Whereas in our approach 
the preferences of the players determine the probabilities for coalition forming. Any coalition 
is defined to be ex ante impossible, “strange” coalitions only have a very low probability. 
This may represent the voting situations of the GC in a way that is closer to reality, especially 
if we consider future developments. Further, Kosior et al. (2008) could not have considered 
the rotation details that have been published in 2009 (ECB, 2009) and make wrong 
assumption about them.  
                                                 
6 They take an approach similar to Haubrich/ Humpage (2001). -9- 
 
We concede that the inter-temporal view chosen in Belke/ Styczynska (2006) despite 
the interesting results only represents a simplified view on the rotation model. We already 
agreed that some expansion of this approach is needed in order to analyse the rotation model 
as closely as possible. The discussion of the relevant literature has further shown that there is 
still scope and need for further research in this area. In this paper, we will account for three 
important aspects and present a novel and realistic model of the voting in the ECB’s central 
decision body. First, we will account for the preferences of NBPs. We will consider different 
desired rates of the NBP in dependence of their home economies. Second, we will account for 
the agenda-setting power. And finally, we will take into account the time axis and calculate 
the indices for voting situations that will actually take place.  
 
 
3.  The rotation model 
The organisation of decision making in the ECB is of great importance for its ability to 
achieve its most important goal: price stability. The number of members of monetary decision 
making bodies has to be balanced between the need of efficient and effective decision making 
and an adequate representation of regions. The first requirement is better fulfilled by a 
smaller, the second by a larger committee, especially in the case of the ECB. Successful 
central banks such as the US Fed and the Bundesbank have frequently decided to have 
smaller decision making bodies at the cost of a full representation of the regions; but not so 
the ECB, where once the rotation model comes into force, 15 regional representatives and 6 
members of the EB have a right to vote, while all (up to 27) NCBs attend the meetings. We 
summarise some further characteristics of the rotation model below.  
o  The reduction of voting rights from “one member-one vote” to the rotation 
model is carried out by means of an indicator of economic importance.
7 After 
ranking the countries according to this indicator, their representatives are 
assigned to one of three groups.
8 The voting rights rotate among the members 
of each group, while the voting frequencies are highest for the members of 
group 1 and lowest for the members of group 3.  
                                                 
7 This indicator consists of a five-sixth share of euro GDP at market prices and a one-sixth share in the 
aggregated balance sheet of the euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs). 
8 There is a transition phase in which only 2 groups are formed, as long as the euro area consists of 19 to 21 
members. -10- 
 
o  In a euro area of 27 the ECB’s Governing Council would consist of 27 NCB 
governors and six directors. According to the ECB’s rotation model, voting 
rights would in the end be divided as follows (see Table 2): 
o  The six directors would possess a permanent right to vote. 
o  The five biggest countries (Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain) would 
represent the first group and be allocated a total of four votes, i.e. the 
respective national central bank governors would have to suspend their voting 
right in one-fifth of the meetings. 
o  A total of 8 votes would be assigned to the NCB governors of 14 middle-sized 
member countries. Thus, the participants of this group would be entitled to 
vote in only 57% of all decisions. 
o  The remaining 8 NCB governors would only be allocated 3 rights to vote, 
which implies that they would be suspended from 62.5% of the voting dates. 
o  Irrespective of their specific voting rights, all NCB governors would be able to 
participate in the discussions on the monetary policy of the ECB Governing 
Council. 
It is important to incorporate some further details of the rotation model that have been 
published only recently by the ECB (ECB, 2009) in any game-theoretic analysis of ECB 
voting behaviour. According to these newly available details, rotation (i.e. a change in the 
allocation of voting rights) will take place monthly. In contrast to earlier speculations in the 
literature (e.g. Kosior et al., 2008), not every NCB governor who was suspended from voting 
in the previous period will regain his voting right in the following month. The number of the 
so-called rotating NCBs will be determined by the difference between the number of national 
representatives in the GC and the number of votes allocated to each group minus two, taking 
the absolute value in case of a negative number. The ECB claims that this mode of rotation 
guarantees the highest level of stability in the composition of the GC combined with only 
short periods of absence. This statement is somehow supported by Tables 1 and 2 in which 
two examples of the rotation mode for 6 months are presented. Visibly, the changes in the 
composition of the committee are relatively gentle. The starting point of the rotation will be a 
random point in an alphabetically ordered
9 list of the euro area members. We will consider 
                                                 
9 The listing of the countries follows the standard of the EU, where countries are listed alphabetically according 
to their names using the Latin alphabet, see e.g. Table 4.  -11- 
 
exactly the scenarios in Table 1 and 2 (22 versus 27 euro area members) in our calculations of 
the preference-based power measure in section 5 and take one possible starting point and 
succeeding 6 months into account. The observed stability, i.e. the absence of strong month-to-
month shifts, as shown later does hold for the allocation of voting power within certain limits.  












































































































group 1  5  4  1  1                      
a1                 0  0  0  0     4
a2               0  0 0 0 0  5
a3              0  0    0  0  0  5
a4              0  0  0  0  0  5
a5              0  0  0  0  0  5
group 2  11  8  3  1                      
b1                 0  0  0  0  0  5
b2                   0  0  0  0  4
b3                     0  0  0  3
b4              0      0  0  3
b5              0  0        0  3
b6              0  0  0         3
b7              0  0  0  0       4
b8              0  0  0  0  0     5
b9               0  0  0 0 0 0  6
b10               0  0  0 0 0 0  6
b11               0  0  0 0 0 0  6
group 3  6  3  3  1                      
c1                 0  0  0       3
c2                   0  0  0     3
c3                     0  0  0  3
c4              0      0  0  3
c5              0  0        0  3
c6              0  0  0         3
sum:  22  15     3                      
Source: Own calculations, based on ECB (2009). 
Note that Tables 1 and 2 reveal one further important characteristic of the rotation 
model: even if it allocates voting rights equally between the members of each group on 
average, this is not the case at single periods in time. The exerted frequency of voting after 6 -12- 
 
months can vary for the members of group 2 between 3 and 6 times, ex post. In other 
scenarios and time perspectives this interval might even be higher.  
Another example could be a snapshot after 12 months. With 24 NBPs, each member of 
the second group would have voted 8 times, a member of the first group between 9 and 10 
times. In this case, the frequency of votes ex post also varies substantially for the members of 
the third group. In this time period, members of this group would vote between 4 and 6 times. 
The ex post inequality resulting from these intervals is even higher in the case of 21 NBPs in 
the GC where the members of the first group have exerted their voting rights 9-10 times, 
while a NBP contained in the second group has voted between 6 and 10 times after one year. 









































































































group 1  5  4  1  1                      
a1                 0  0  0  0     4
a2               0  0  0 0 0  5
a3              0  0    0  0  0  5
a4              0  0  0    0  0  5
a5               0 0 0 0    0  5
group 2  14  8  6  4                      
b1                 0  0    0  0  4
b2                 0  0    0  0  4
b3                 0  0      0  3
b4                 0  0      0  3
b5                   0  0    0  3
b6                   0  0    0  3
b7               0  0  0        3
b8               0  0  0        3
b9               0    0 0     3
b10               0    0 0     3
b11              0  0    0  0     4
b12              0  0    0  0     4
b13              0  0      0  0  4
b14              0  0      0  0  4
group 3  8  3  5  3                      
c1                 0    0       2
c2                 0      0     2
c3                 0      0     2
c4                   0    0     2
c5                   0      0  2
c6               0  0     0  3
c7               0    0    0  3
c8              0        0        2
sum:  27  15     8                      
Source: Own calculations, based on ECB (2009). -13- 
 
Obviously, the date of enlargement of the Governing Council will never be defined by 
questions of a just entitlement with voting rights but by the moment of accession of a country 
to the euro area which is determined by the Maastricht criteria. This is why the transformation 
from one rotation schedule to a new one will occur only by chance specifically in a moment 
where the NBPs of a group have exerted their votes equally frequently. Moreover, there exists 
nearly no possibility of this occurring for all concerned groups at the same time,
10 whereas the 
differences resulting in a randomly chosen point of time might even be large. This kind of 
unequal treatment of members of one group has been considered by the ECB only in so far as 
it considers the case that a NCB has to sustain its vote always in the same periods of the year. 
Then, discretionary changes in the composition of the GC can be decided upon.
11  
We take into account this new piece of information about the rotation procedure and 
explicitly consider the preferences of NCB governors in our model. This enables us to assess 
which consequences on the allocation of power result from the introduction of the rotation 
model. In the following, we introduce the preference-based power measure (Passarelli/ Barr, 
2007) which we will use later on in our analysis.  
 
4.  The theoretical model 
4.1. The preference-based power measure of Passarelli/ Barr (2007) 
Classical power indices focus on effects of formal rules on the individual power of single 
players. Hereby, they abstract from possible preferences players could have in coalitions 
building and only consider information about voting rules and weights. These indices are 
useful if preferences are unknown or variable, or if a study concentrates on the effects of the 
formal voting rules. However, if information about preferences of the players is available, it 
can be used to generate a more detailed view of the voting body. Passarelli/ Barr (2007) 
consider a voting body whose members have preferences that can be mapped on a policy 
space and where the set of voted issues is random. They construct a power measure based on 
a randomization scheme with the following appealing characteristics. First, the distance 
between the ideal point of a player and the voted issue determines the probability of this 
player to vote “yes” to the concerning issue. The larger this distance, the lower this 
                                                 
10 The period of time after which each NBP in GC has exerted his voting right exactly as often as each NBP in 
his group is lower than the product of the equalisation frequencies only in cases where one frequency is an exact 
multiple at least one other, like in the case of 20 NBPs. 
11 Article 1.1 of the implementing decision runs as follows: “The Governing Council may decide to change the 
order of rotation for the second and third groups to avoid the situation that certain governors are always without 
a voting right at the same periods of the year.” -14- 
 
probability will be. Second, being pivotal in a highly likely voting amplifies a player’s power 
measure to a larger extent than being pivotal in a less likely voting. An agenda-setter can be 
modelled by a distortion of the distribution of the voted. This preference-based power 
measure is applicable to the GC because the preferences of its members can be mapped on a 
policy space. It enables us to consider the preferences of the GC members and to introduce 
the ECB’s President as agenda-setter.
12  
In the following, we consider a weighted majority game with the player set 
N={1,2,…,n}.  S is called a coalition if  N S ⊆ . The characteristic function v ( ℜ →
N 2 ) 
assigns 1 to a winning coalition (v(S)=1) and 0 to a losing coalition (v(S)=0). A coalition is a 




, with  i w  
being the voting weight of player i.  
The multilinear extension of games presented by Owen (1972) makes it possible to 
introduce randomization in the coalition formation. Then, a player i is not necessarily either 
member or outsider of a coalition S, but joins this coalition with a certain probability. 
Consider as an example a 3-players game and the coalition S={1,2}. A coalition can be 
written as a vector with  ) 0 ( 1 = i x if i is a member of the coalition (is not a member of the 
coalition). In our example, we write for S=(1,1,0). If  1 0 ≤ ≤ i x , then  i x  can be interpreted as 
the probability that player i participates in coalition S  ) ( i ∋ . The probability for coalition S to 




i i x x S P 1 ) ( .  
The multilinear extension (MLE) of a game v (Owen, 1972) enters the following 
expression:  
 ∏ ∏







N S S i
i
S i
i n S v x x x x f ) ( ) 1 ( ) ,..., ( 1 , 
which represents the expected value of the game in this setting.  
                                                 
12 This is also possible with the Owen-Shapley method (Owen and Shapley, 1989). The Passarelli/ Barr method 
has the advantage that, contrary to the Owen-Shapley method, the probability of zero is not assigned to any 
coalition a priori. Rather, very unlikely coalitions are assigned a very low probability (Passarelli/ Barr, 2007, p. 
43). Further contributions to the literature of preference-based power measures can be found in Napel/ Widgrén 
(2004 and 2005). -15- 
 
The expected marginal contribution by player i is given by the partial derivative of the 
MLE function with respect to  i x  and can be interpreted as a power measure in simple games 
(Owen, 1972):  
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Let us now consider some additional assumptions within the Passarelli/ Barr (2007) 
model framework. Let 
m ℜ ⊆ Θ  be a political m-dimensional space, and  Θ ∈ θ  a random 
political issue.  () θ p  is the density function of θ , with  () 	
Θ
=1 θ θ d p . 
Coalitions are formed at random.  () θ i q  describes the probability that i will participate 
in the coalition  () N S ⊆ θ . This function is single-peaked in  i P  and i P  describes the ideal 
point of player i. Player i joins S( i P ) with the probability 1 ( 1 ) ( = i i P q ). In the setting of 
voting games the probability  () θ i q  can also be interpreted as the likelihood that player i votes 
“yes” to issue θ . If his ideal point is discussed, player i always votes “yes”.  
The preference-based power measure  i ψ  (Passarelli/ Barr 2007) of player i is defined 
as the expected value of  i f  given the above randomization structure:  
()() 	
Θ
= θ θ θ ψ d p fi i . 













The preference-based power measure has originally been applied by Passarelli/ Barr 
(2009) to analyse the distribution of voting power within the European Commission, where 
the respective empirical realisation of an indicator of eurosceptism (Eurobarometer) is 
interpreted as the Commission members’ preferences. Analogously, we interpret the country-
specific empirical realisations of an indicator of the future economic development (here: the -16- 
 
inflation rate) as preferences of the members of the euro area.
13 Such an indicator has been 
developed by Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009). In their case, the latter represents an 
estimation of interest rate preferences of the euro area member states. We will describe it 
briefly in the following. 
 
 
4.2.  Preference-based power measure for the GC 
 
Interest rate preferences 
The aim of the approach taken by Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) is to study the “core-
periphery” balance of interest rate preferences within the GC. The authors apply the median 
voter concept to the GC by explicitly modelling the interest rates preferences of its members. 
The latter are calculated for the GC members referring to simple Taylor rules and based on a 
convergence assumption relying on a specific set of assumptions (among others, linear 
convergence of price levels within 30 years) concerning the convergence of the economies 
towards the euro-12 aggregate.
14 It is well over a decade since John B. Taylor set out what has 
become part of the current orthodoxy of monetary economics by now. In his seminal paper, 
John B. Taylor (1993) shows that the monetary policy decisions of central banks can be 
described reasonably well by a simple reaction equation. The latter is usually modelled as a 
function of, among others, inflation and the output gap. Despite its simplicity, the Taylor 
reaction function has been shown to have a high degree of reliance in explaining monetary 
policy.
15  
Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) start with four versions of the Taylor rule. We have finally 
have decided to strictly follow Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) and to omit those considering 
shocks in the output gap, because it is rather arbitrary to calibrate future shocks and the 
estimation of the output gaps heavily relies on variance-covariance matrices of the past. The 
latter might prove critical especially if one takes into account that even the euro-22 scenario 
(not to mention the euro-27 scenario) will become reality rather far away in the future.
16 
Hence, we either stick to the truncated version of the Taylor rule or assume that inflation 
                                                 
13 Remember that Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) derive some estimates of the future inflation rate and, thus, 
also the future preferred Taylor interest rate. We follow their approach because the scenarios of 22 and 27 
members of the euro area which we focus on are also located in the future. In order to analyze these scenarios, 
we have to consider an indicator for future monetary policy preferences. 
14 This aggregate refers to the area of the EU between 2000 and 2006. 
15 This has been shown, for instance, for the countries of the EMU in 1990-1998 by Gerlach/ Schnabel (2000).  
16Technically, it is also possible to apply the other versions as well. Our results do not change dramatically in 
this case and are available on request.  -17- 
 
targets equal the actual country-specific inflation rates. We feel legitimized to proceed like 
that with an eye on the limits in forecasting business cycle convergence and the fact that the 
remaining two scenarios map the interest rate preferences in a sufficiently accurate fashion for 
our purposes.
17 
The first scenario is the truncated version of the Taylor rule in which no output gap is 
considered and a  % 2 ~ = k π  inflation target is assumed. Consequently, the short-term nominal 
interest rate of country k is derived from its “neutral” interest rate  k r , its inflation rate  k π  and 
its target inflation rate  k π ~ : 
() k k k k k r i π π π ~ 5 . 0 − + + = .                    (truncated Taylor rule) 
In the second scenario, calculated as a robustness check, we assume country-specific 
inflation targets. Here the inflation targets equal the actual inflation rates. In this case, the 
Taylor rule boils down to the Fisher equation: 
k k k r i π + = .            (Fisher rule) 
The preferred interest rates apply to the future performance of the economies of the 
euro area. Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) choose to forecast the inflation rate based on the 
assumption of a linear convergence of the price levels to the euro-12 aggregate in 2007 within 
30 years.
18 Assuming linear convergence allows disregarding the exact moment of 
enlargement and is also of special interest for our approach. The “neutral” levels of real 
interest rates are set equal to the long-run real GDP growth.
19 The preferred interest rates are 
reported together with the results in section 5, for instance, in Table 4. There, it can be 
observed that countries in group 3 are relatively hawkish as compared to the Board or the 
members of group one, while group 2 unsurprisingly turns out to be the most heterogeneous 
as it concerns the preferred interest rates.
20 This is due to the central influence of inflation in 
the Taylor-rule.
21 
                                                 
17 Nevertheless, we have recalculated our main results using the interest rate preferences calculated by Bénassy-
Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) for the scenarios of positive and negative output shocks. These results are in line with 
those presented later in this paper and are available from the authors upon request.  
18 The euro-12 aggregate relates to the euro area perimeter from 2000 to 2006. 
19 For further details on the calculations and data sources, see Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009, pp. 46-51). 
20 This observation is equally valid if the output gap is considered (positive/ negative shocks). The remaining 
variations between the preferred interest rates due to different calculations have only a minor influence on our 
calculations, because we are interested in the balance between the European and the nationalistic view in the GC 
and the position of the European view is very stable over all possible calculations.  
21 Similar results concerning preferred interest rates are presented in Berger/ de Haan (2003).  -18- 
 
Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) use their results to simulate the GC’s decision by 
means of the median voter approach. Hereby, they assume the NCB governors to vote as 
nationalist representatives of their home countries (“home bias”) and the EB as a 
representative of the “euro view”. Nevertheless, the authors do not question the applicability 
of this assumption, but claim to design a worst case scenario which reveals the ability of the 
rotation model to cope with nationalistic preferences. We strictly follow this approach in our 
study. As will be shown in the following chapter, we also consider scenarios in which the EB 
is not homogeneous but consisting of national representatives. As we focus on the balance of 
power between the national and euro-wide preferences, we always model at least one 
representative of each view. 
 
Euro area enlargement - considered scenarios 
In this study, we focus on the scenario of euro area enlargement up to 22 members. As 
opposed to a scenario of 27 members, the opt-out countries (United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Denmark) as well as Romania and Bulgaria
22 are not considered here as members of the euro 
area. This is just to account for a realistic medium-term scenario, given the fact that all 
enlargement scenarios have become very fragile due to the financial crisis. This would 
eventually represent a “big bang” scenario, according to which a great number of central and 
middle European countries would access the euro area at once. The voting behaviour of a GC 
comprising the maximum possible number of 27 euro area member states is calculated only in 
the basic scenario - just for comparative purposes. 
The pattern underlying our scenarios is represented in Table 3. In the basic scenario, 
we consider nationalistic NCBs and a homogeneous EB voting as one player with 6 voting 
rights and preferences referring to the euro area. This is the most common assumption in the 
literature (Belke/ Styczynska, 2006, Bindseil, 2001, Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch, 2009). 
Additionally, we calculate scenarios in which the EB is considered as heterogeneous. Hence, 
the euro view is represented by the president of the ECB while the other members act as 
additional representatives of their countries of origin. Hereby, we consider three possible 
alternatives: the actual composition of the Board
23 and two polar compositions. In the extreme 
scenarios, the members of EB except the ECB President come from the 5 countries with the 
                                                 
22 According to any serious forecast, it is not very realistic that these countries will fulfil the Maastricht criteria 
in the medium term. 
23 Currently, the EB comprises members from Greece, Italy, Spain, Germany and Austria. -19- 
 
lowest (Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Germany), respectively highest interest rate 
preferences (Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland).  
We consider this specific array of scenarios just in order to reveal the respective 
effects on the allocation of power in the GC, even though we are aware of the fact that some 
of them are hardly realistic from a political point of view. Especially the consideration of the 
two polar scenarios enables us to show that the composition of the Board has a major 
influence on the allocation of power to the committee members in the heterogeneity scenario. 
Expecting that further euro area enlargement will take place not earlier than within the not too 
close future and that reality will level out at an intermediate scenario, the above results mark 
limits for the distribution of power for less extreme compositions of the EB that can hardly be 
estimated today.
24 
In the euro area, NCB governors are generally regarded as representatives of their 
countries of origin and thus are supposed to be guided by a national bias in their voting 
behaviour. Many studies in this field are based on this assumption (Belke/ Styczynska, 2006, 
Bindseil, 2001, Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch, 2009). It refers to the classical analysis by Meade 
(2003a, b, c) and by Meade/ Sheets (2002, 2005) who show that a national bias in the 
decision-making of the GC is quite probable. As long as the NCBs are regarded as 
representatives of their home countries and appointed by national governments, the suspicion 
persists that they also act as national representatives, and vote in favour of their home 
countries. The introduction of the rotation model should even reinforce this effect.   
Many of the studies cited above are also based on the assumption of a homogeneous 
EB. Nevertheless, others have expressed their doubts about the correctness of this assumption 
(Varela/ Sanchez-Santos, 2003). This is exactly why we consider three scenarios with a 
heterogeneous EB. In these cases, the ECB President is considered as the representative of the 
euro view.
25 For each scenario, we distinguish two possible settings: with and without an 
agenda-setter. The agenda-setter is represented by the preferences of a homogeneous EB or of 
the president himself if the EB is heterogeneous. In a final step, as a robustness check, we 
repeat the calculations with the inflation rates based on member-specific inflation targets as 
proposed by Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009).  
                                                 
24 Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) consider polar scenarios of a homogeneous GC for the calculations of the 
median interest rates under the rotation model. 
25 We are aware of the fact that some evidence has been presented for nationalist tendencies in the Presidents’ 
voting behaviour (Varela/ Sanchez-Santos, 2003) even though such a scenario would be offended by the ECB 
itself. Our study is particularly interested in the balance of power between the core and the periphery, this is why 
we always introduce a representative of the European perspective. -20- 
 
Table 3 – Number of euro area member countries - investigated scenarios 


















             
Source: Own presentation.  
 
Setup of calculations 
For a proper implementation of our theoretical model we have to impose some additional 
assumptions. The latter concern the probability generating function q and the modelling of the 
agenda-setter and have an impact on the results. Thus, they should be chosen carefully and 
taken into account when analysing the results. In the first case, we have decided to use the 
standard function introduced by Passarelli/ Barr (2007) but to adjust the way the desired 
interest rates enter this function. We calibrate the inputs in order to achieve a relatively strong 
discrimination between the coalitions and at the same time realistic probabilities in coalition 
formation. In the resulting functions, the probability of Germany saying “yes” to the euro 
area’s preferred interest rate turns out to be approximately 90% in all scenarios, while the 
same probability for Poland only amounts to around 10%.  
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The preferences of the agenda-setter are always defined as the euro area’s preferred 
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In order to calculate the indices, we simulate the coalition formation for 200 values of 
θ . For each value of θ , each player is excluded from the player set successively. For each 
player, 15000 coalitions are then formed at random, given the probability generating functions 
i q . Average marginal contributions are calculated for each player as the relative frequency of 
this player being pivotal in the simulated coalitions. The former are then summed up over all 
values of θ . The details can best be shown referring to the example of a fixed θ . We do this 
in the following. 
 
One important step of analysis - fixing the thetas 
Considering the situation for a fixed θ  corresponds to the look at a scenario in which the 
voted issue is known and the probability for every coalition is, thus, determined by the 
functions  i q . According to our theoretical model presented above, the power measure of a 
player i results as his probability of being pivotal in any possible coalition. Strictly following 
Passarelli/ Barr (2007), we calculate this measure by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. For 
each θ , the considered player is removed from the player set as a first step. As a second step, 
then, 15000 coalitions are simulated for the remaining n-1 players, given the probability 
generating functions  i q . This allows us to estimate the probability of coalitions agreeing to 
the issue at stake, dependent on their size (in terms of votes). Player i is pivotal in all losing 
coalitions that achieve the required majority by his joining. The sum of the probabilities for 
player i being pivotal then gives the preference-based power measure for a given parameter 
θ . 
-  Figures 1 and 2 about here - 
As an example, we consider the scenario of 22 euro area members and a homogeneous 
EB. Figures 1 and 2 display the estimation of the coalition formation for two values of θ  (1 
and 2), we consider the simulation after exclusion of two members of the GC, Germany and 
the EB respectively as examples.
26 If a player disposes of 6 votes, he can be pivotal in a 
higher number of coalitions than a player endowed with one vote.
27 For θ =1 (i = 0.05), an 
issue close to EB’s preferences is discussed ( 0454 . 0 = EB i ), while θ =2 (i = 0.1) is further 
away from the EB’s (and also from most NBPs) preferences. This pattern becomes manifest 
                                                 
26 Of course, choosing Germany with one vote and the EB with six votes underlines the differences of the results 
as strong as possible in our context. 
27 Remember that the parameter θ  amounts to 0.05 and 0.1, respectively, according to section 4.   -22- 
 
in the respective relative frequencies: for θ =1 much more players (including the EB) are 
“willing” to join the “yes”-coalitions than for θ =2. After exclusion of Germany, the mode of 
the single-peaked frequency distribution is located at a value of 15 for θ =1 and at 4 for θ =2. 
Apparently, the most frequent coalitions do not include the EB for θ =2. While for θ =1 the 5 
most frequent coalitions in terms of size are composed of nearly all NBPs or the EB plus 7 to 
11 NBPs. We can observe analogous differences for both values of θ  for the coalition 
formation after exclusion of the EB, too. While the mode for θ =1 is 10, it is much lower for 
θ =2 (4).  
These distributions which result from the probability generating functions  i q  
determine the power measures for the considered players Germany and EB. Germany has one 
vote in the GC and can only be decisive for coalitions that collect 10 votes. Their estimated 
probability amounts to 0.068 for θ =1 and at 0.055 for θ =2 and represents the preference-
based power measure for the given values of θ . The influence of a player with one vote is 
generally low in a committee with majority voting and overall 22 votes, but the classical 
Shapley-Shubik index would be lower than both preference-based measures with 0.0417. 
Thus, the position of Germany is more influential in both situations than in the symmetric 
case. If θ =1, Germany’s power index is higher, which shows that for this issue players agree 
more easily and a coalition of 10 is formed with a higher probability. 
The EB can be decisive in a larger number of coalitions, disposing of 6 votes its 
joining turns all losing coalitions to winning that dispose of 5 to 10 votes. While the 
(symmetric) Shapley-Shubik-index of the EB would be 0.375, the preference-based power 
measure discriminates between the two issues dramatically. For θ =1, the empirical realisation 
of this power index even amounts to 0.6706, whereas it turns out to be very much lower for 
θ =2 (i.e., 0.2497). This pattern implies that in case of the first value coalitions in the relevant 
range have a higher probability. 
5.  Results 
The basic scenario 
Table 4 summarizes our results with respect to the preference-based power measures for the 
basic scenario in which we consider a euro area with 22 members and a homogeneous EB. In 
this case, we consider the homogeneous EB as a group of experts who consistently vote in 
favour of the euro area. They are represented in our game as one player endowed with six -23- 
 
votes and the preferred interest rate which equals the one of the euro area. In Table 4, the 
preference-based power measures are reported for the scenarios without and with an agenda-
setter. At least two observations emerge after a first visual inspection of the results. On the 
one hand, the power indices of the NBPs differ in both scenarios - with a minimum around 
0.02 and a maximum up to 0.032. On the other hand, it is visible that the homogeneous EB 
has a dominant position in the GC. With an MLE index of around 0.6 in the scenario without 
an agenda-setter the EB is allotted a higher power index than in the symmetric Shapley-
Shubik case (0.375). This observation confirms the results of Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) 
who have already discussed the EB’s favourable position on the policy space in this scenario. 
However, especially in the scenario in which EB sets the agenda of the voting, it is attributed 
the bulk part of the influence on the voting outcome with 95% to 96% of power.  
-  Table 4 about here - 
Figures 3 and 4 allow a closer look on the allocation of power in the GC concerning 
these two observations. In Figure 3, the values of the preference-based power measure for all 
considered points of time are compared for the EB and the scenarios with and without 
agenda-setter. In the second scenario, we see the power of the EB stabilised on a very high 
level. In the first scenario, we observe at least some variations; apparently, the changes in the 
composition of the GC imposed by the rotation model are once more once less favourable to 
the EB at the considered points in time. In Figure 4, the changes of the power index of 
Germany in the scenario without agenda-setter take the opposite direction. In month 2, 
Germany disposes about 2 percent of the power and 3 percent in month 3. In month 4 this 
value lies at about 2 and at ca 3 percent in month 5. If the EB takes the part of the agenda-
setter, Germany has a power index of 0.2 to 0.3 percent. Even if a downward tendency is 
visible here it should not be over-interpreted because the power values for all NBPs are lower 
than 1 percent in the agenda-setter scenario. As a consequence, the differences between the 
indices can only be very small. Notably, the NBPs have a similarly small influence on the 
voting outcome, opposite to the EB’s dominant position. 
-  Figure 3 about here - 
-  Figure 4 about here - 
We have seen that Germany’s influence has increased in value from month 2 to month 
3. In order to analyse possible reasons for this quite dramatic loss of power we also compare 
the distribution of power across the NBPs for these two months. Figure 5 summarises these -24- 
 
values for the scenario without agenda-setter, whereas the ordering of the countries is 
increasing depending on in their preferred interest rates. In month 3, the NBPs with 
preferences for lower interest rates have higher shares in power than the countries with higher 
preferred interest rates. The opposite is the case with respect to month 2, even if the 
differences are less evident. We feel legitimized to explain this pattern in the following way. 
In month 3, the rotation model generates a composition of the GC according to which a larger 
share of NBPs has relatively higher interest rates preferences.
28 While these members with 
similar preferences can form coalitions quite “easily”, they do not possess the required 
majority. Consequently, the NBPs with preferences for lower interest rates have the potential 
to be pivotal in a larger portion of coalitions. The opposite is the case for month 5, where 8 
NBPs have a preferred interest rate of lower than 5 percent.  
-  Figure 5 about here - 
For the scenario with 22 euro area member countries, the power index analysis under 
consideration of the preferred interest rates (Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch, 2009) has revealed the 
following characteristics of the rotation model. For the scenario without an agenda-setter we 
observe a strong position of the EB, considerable differences in power indices of single NBPs 
and perceivable effects of the composition of the GC on power distribution. Especially the 
first result goes in line with the results of the median voter analysis of Bénassy-Quéré/ 
Turkisch (2009) and the voting power analysis by Kosior et al. (2008). Consequently, the 
power of the (homogeneous) EB has been underestimated by the symmetric and average 
consideration in Belke/ Styczynska (2006). The position of the EB on the political space has a 
very favourable influence on its power index. Nevertheless, one main result of Belke/ 
Styczynska (2006), the unexpected shifts in power, has been confirmed by the preference-
based power index analysis. In the scenario with an agenda-setter, which has been effected for 
the first time in a power index analysis of the GC, we see an overall dominating position of 
the EB and unessential power of the NBPs. This means that if the EB votes homogeneously in 
favour of the euro area, the rotation model leads to a decision making dominated de facto by a 
Committee of Experts (EB) in which the NBPs cannot influence the decision. By their 
presence at the meetings, they more or less only report about regional economic 
developments. This is a strong argument in support of the rotation model, because it shows 
that the European perspective is very dominant. This should allow the GC to be capable to act 
                                                 
28 In month 3, there are eight NBPs with a preferred interest rate of over 5%. -25- 
 
in favour of the whole euro zone, while taking into consideration regional information made 
available by the regional representatives.
29  
-  Table 5 about here - 
Such an outcome in terms of voting power is comparable to the strengthening of the 
position of the EB envisaged by reform proposals presented in the eve of the introduction of 
the Rotation model by e.g. Gros (2003) where a change in responsibilities between the Board 
and the NBPs has been suggested.
30 While the GC should meet less frequently, decide about 
the directions of the monetary policy and inform the EB about the regional economic 
situation, the Board should be responsible for the daily issues of ECB’s monetary policy and 
meet several times a month. While the rotation model is less radical as it comes to the reform 
of the institutional setup, it seems to possibly lead to a similar result in terms of influence on 
the policy outcomes, and nevertheless combine a high degree of representativeness with a 
sound core-periphery balance. The reason for the choice of a less radical reform might lie in 
the political process that is central for the composition of all European decision bodies, or in 
an observation made by Hefeker (2002). Hefeker argues that economic areas with highly 
heterogeneous member states tend to delegate power to a centrally appointed board less 
frequently.  
These results are confirmed by the consideration of the preferred interest rates deducted from 
the Fisher Rule by Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) and do not change considerably for the 
scenario of 27 member states.
31 On the contrary, the consideration of a heterogeneous EB 
leads to a structural change of the results in several aspects, as will be shown in the next 
chapter.  
 
The heterogeneity scenarios 
In our heterogeneity scenarios we consider different compositions of the EB and assume that, 
apart from the president, all members of the EB cast their vote according to their home 
countries’ interests. We consider the actual composition of the EB (Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Germany, Austria), and two extreme scenarios which deviate significantly from the actual 
                                                 
29 The position of the EB would be weaker in a scenario with 22 members and the “one member- one vote” rule. 
Without agenda-setting power the EB would be pivotal in less than 30% of potential situations. In the agenda-
setting scenario the power of the EB turns out to be 84%. See Table 5.  
30 Berger/ de Haan (2002) also argue that a strengthening of the power of the EB would lead to a better balance 
between core and periphery in the GC. 
31 See Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix.  -26- 
 
one. In our extreme scenarios, we have first five representatives of countries with lowest 
preferred interest rates (Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Germany) and five 
representatives with the highest interest rate preferences (Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland).  
We establish the above scenarios just in order to assess which potential influence the 
composition of the EB has in different heterogeneity scenarios. Note again that the respective 
results are not  meant to be forecasts of actual  future voting behaviour within the ECB 
Governing Council. In all scenarios with the respective results reported in Tables A1, A2 and 
A3 in the appendix, the ECB President represents the European view. But his position in 
terms of voting power is not comparable to the position of the EB in the homogeneous 
scenarios. Not even the consideration of the agenda-setting power of the ECB president can 
assure his dominant position vis-a-vis the “periphery” as observed in the homogeneous 
scenarios which we discussed further above. 
Figures 3 to 5 display the distribution of power in case of the three heterogeneous 
scenarios, as an example, for month 1. In each figure, we observe an equalisation of power 
indices as compared to the homogeneous scenario. Furthermore, non-negligible differences 
between the allocation of power to different players (and to each player in the successive 
points of time) still persist. Here, all considered players are endowed with one voting right. 
All differences are consequently driven by the position of the players in the policy space and 
by the distortion of the distribution of the issues through the introduction of an agenda-setter.  
-  Table 6 about here -  
In our scenario with the actual composition of members of the EB and the low 
preference scenario, the situation is relatively favourable to the members of group one and the 
members of EB. They have relatively high power indices. Here, the ECB President still 
profits from his agenda-setting power by a rise in his power index of ca. 2%. Table 6 lists the 
sum of power indices of players with preferences lower (resp. higher) than 5%, for each 
scenario and month. Here, we see that this sum is always higher for the members with lower 
preferences in the discussed scenarios. Consequently, the given composition of the EB is 
favourable to the group of players with lower preferences. The reason for this is that due to 
the additional representatives of lower preferred interest rates in the EB (as compared to the 
homogeneous scenario), these players can form winning coalitions on their own. Month 2, in 
which they collect 13 votes in the scenario with the actual composition of the EB (resp. 14 in -27- 
 
the low preferences composition) is an extreme example. The higher indices result from the 
fact that these players form coalitions more easily and each of them has a high probability of 
being pivotal in coalitions with other players with similar preferences.  
This picture changes dramatically for the high preferences scenario. Here, the 
members of the GC with higher interest rates preferences can form winning coalitions. Take 
as an example month 3: there are 13 players with preferences ranging beyond 5%. According 
to the discussion above, this situation is favourable to this group in the GC, they have a 
cumulative power of 65%. Furthermore, we can see in Table 6 that the introduction of the 
President as agenda-setter is profitable to the group of players with lower interest preferences, 
even though their gain in cumulative power never exceeds 10%. Regarding the individual 
power indices, this scenario leads to a further equalisation between the players. Especially the 
President does not take a particular position here. This is the less favourable scenario for the 
ECB President as representative of the euro area view, as he has the lowest power indices and 
does not improve his position distinctly as soon as he is the agenda-setter.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
According to the literature, there exist a couple of possibilities how agenda-setting power can 
be incorporated into and treated within a theoretical model. In the model of Passarelli and 
Barr (2004), a shift in the power distribution may depend on changes in the preferences of the 
agenda-setter. However, Bénassy-Quéré and Turkisch (2009) is one of the few studies which 
emphasize the role of the Executive Board. They derive and emphasize in their study that the 
EB always takes a median position in the political space. This increases their real influence 
beyond the assessment according to classical power indices.  
The new randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games 
applied by us allows accounting for this pattern. What is more, we show that it is also possible 
to quantify the effect of agenda-setting power of the EB. As our prior, we expected it to lead 
to an even higher concentration of power to the EB, and have finally found our view 
confirmed by the results gained in this paper. However, how to treat the fact that the president 
decides in the case of a tie is still an open issue. We leave this task for future research.  
For illustrative purposes, we would like to explicitly stress our results gained for the 
homogeneity scenario. In this case, the literature also shows that the rather complex rotation 
model tends to deliver rather simple output in terms of voting power analysis. Indeed, those -28- 
 
studies which explain monetary policy decisions by drawing upon different country-specific 
preferences, point at a heterogeneous Executive Board. But exactly these studies explain 
decisions on the policy rates by preferences and we demonstrate explicitly that "strategically 
favourable" preferences help to enforce more voting power than other preferences. According 
to our analysis, the ECB Executive Board is stuck „in the middle“ and, hence, has a larger 
voting power.
32 We would like to argue that conventional studies are not able to take into 
account these important properties of the game because they tend to focus (solely) on the 
derivation of Nash-equilibria.  
We now come up with a couple of conclusions. Let us first tackle the general ones 
before we differentiate homogeneity and the heterogeneity scenarios with respect to the 
composition of the ECB Executive Board. In general we feel legitimized to state that an 
impact of preferences on monetary policy decisions is clearly visible across the results. An 
impact of the agenda-setter is corroborated as well - in most cases to the benefit of the 
agenda-setter. In all scenarios, we establish a difference between the power indices of the 
different NCB governors and between the power indices with and without agenda-setter. 
Hence, differences in the allocation of power result from transitions from one month to the 
next. However, these differences are mitigated by the so-called (-2)-rule of the ECB (ECB 
2009). According to this rule, not every national central bank governor regains his voting 
power immediately after having exerted it. Differences in voting power between specific 
months might well be large, as shown in case of the basic scenario for months 2 and 3. 
When we consider the case of a homogenous  ECB Executive Board, there is a 
significant impact of the EB even if it is not the agenda-setter. The EB has around 95 percent 
of the voting power at its disposal if it is endowed with agenda-setting power. Our results 
closely correspond to those gained by Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) who have shown that 
the position of the EB is so advantageous that based on a median voter approach the European 
perspective of the EB tends to dominate the EC voting decisions.  
However, if we assume the EB to be heterogeneous, the overall pattern changes 
dramatically. In this case, the European view is “only one among others”. The euro area 
countries which have managed to have a representative in the EB improve their situation. This 
is especially valid in a scenario in which members of the EB have preferences for high 
interest rates. 
                                                 
32 Note that Bénassy-Quéré/ Turkisch (2009) arrive at nearly the same conclusion, i.e. that the homogenous 
Executive Board takes an especially advantageous position in the policy space. -29- 
 
We admit that there are still some open questions with respect to an analysis of the 
voting power within the rotation model. For instance, one could draw some parallels to some 
considerations by Servais (2005, p. 261) who argues that, in practice, “consensus” is reached 
after searching for majorities in a rather dynamic way. In such a kind of setting, our approach 
appears to be rather capable of matching the power relations quite well. Moreover, we have 
construed the notions of “agenda-setting” and “coalition formation” in a rather narrow fashion 
in order to flesh out the differential impacts as clearly as possible. Of course, this leaves some 
ample room for additional calculations taking into account, for instance, that “reality” is 
located in between our scenario with and without agenda-setting power. What is more, a 
legitimate question would be to ask which one of our scenarios is the most relevant one. In 
order to be really able to give a sound answer to this question, one would have to take power 
indices into account if using an approach which explains the ECB monetary policy decisions 
by preferences. This is because only in this way it can be identified which members of the 
Governing Council have strategically beneficial preferences which give them more power 
than visible at first glance.  
Generally speaking, we can only hope that the composition of the Executive Board 
will remain rather homogeneous in the future as well. This would ensure a stable environment 




Belke, A. (2003), The Rotation Model is Not Sustainable, Intereconomics: Review of 
European Economic Policy 38, 119-124. 
Belke, A., Styczynska, B. (2006), The Allocation of Power in the Enlarged ECB Governing 
Council: An Assessment of the ECB Rotation Model, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 44(5), 865-897. 
Bénassy-Quéré, A., Turkisch, E. (2009), The ECB Governing Council in an Enlarged Euro 
Area, Journal of Common Market Studies 47(1), 25-53. 
Berger, H., De Haan, J. (2002), Are Small Countries Too Powerful Within the ECB?, Atlantic 
Economic Journal 30(3), 263-282. 
Bindseil, U. (2001), A Coalition-form Analysis of the One Country-One Vote Rule in the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank, International Economic Journal 15, 
141-164. -30- 
 
ECB (2009), ECB Monthly Report, European Central Bank, Frankfurt/Main, July. 
Fahrholz, C., Mohl, P. (2004), EMU Enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-Making 
within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis, Ezoneplus Working 
Paper 23, Frankfurt/Oder. 
Fahrholz, C., Mohl, P. (2006), Does the EMU-enlargement Impair Price Stability in Europe? 
A Voting Power Analysis of the ECB Reform, Homo Oeconomicus 23(2), 219-239. 
Fahrholz, C., Mohl, P. (2008), Machtindexanalyse und Europäische Zentralbank, in: Selck T. 
und Veen T. (Hrsg.), „Die politische Ökonomie des EU-Entscheidungsprozesses“, VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 71-89. 
Gerlach, S., Schnabel, G. (2000), The Taylor Rule and Interest Rates in the EMU Area, 
Economics Letters 67(2), 167-171. 
Gerlach-Kirsten, P. (2006), Monetary Policy Committees and Interest Rate Setting, European 
Economic Review 50(2), 487-507. 
Gerlach, K., Grüner, H.P., Kiel,. A., Schulte, E. (2003), Information Acquisition and Decision 
Making in Committees: A Survey, ECB Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
256, September 2003.  
Gros, D. (2003) An Opportunity Missed!, Intereconomics: Review of European Economic 
Policy 38, 124-129. 
Haubrich, J.G., Humpage, O. (2001), Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper, 
01/03, Cleveland/Ohio. 
Hefeker, C. (2003), Federal Monetary Policy, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, 641-
659. 
Heinemann, F., Hüfner, F.P. (2004), Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? 
National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 51(4), 544–58. 
Meade E. E., Sheets, D. N. (2002), Regional Influences on U.S. Monetary Policy: Some 
Implications for Europe, CEP Discussion Paper, No. 523. 
Meade, E.E. (2003a), EU Enlargement and ECB Decision Making, Online Article, Project 
syndicate (retrieved from http://www.project-syndicate.org, 28 July 2003). 
Meade, E.E. (2003b), A (Critical) Appraisal of the ECB’s Voting Reform, Intereconomics –
Review of European Economic Policy 38, 129-131.  
Meade, E.E. (2003c), How Independent is the ECB?, Online Article, Project syndicate 
(retrieved from http://www.project-sydicate.org, 28 July 2003). 
Meade, E. E., Sheets, D. N. (2005), Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns, Journal 
of Money Credit and Banking, 33, 661-678. -31- 
 
Napel, S., Widgrén, M. (2004), Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis - A Unified 
Approach, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16(4), 517-538. 
Napel, S., Widgrén, M. (2005), The Possibility of a Preference-based Power Index, Journal of 
Theoretical Politics, 17(3), 379-389. 
Kosior, A., Marek Rozkrut, M., Torój, A. (2008), Rotation Scheme of the ECB Governing 
Council: Monetary Policy Effectiveness and Voting Power Analysis, in: “Raport na 
temat pelnego uczestnictwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej w trzecim etapie Unii 
Gospodarczej i Walutowej”, National Bank of Poland, August, 53-102. 
Passarelli, F., Barr, J. (2007), Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in 
the EU, Social Choice and Welfare 28, 41–60. 
Servais, D. (2006), The Future Voting Modalities of the ECB Governing Council, 
Proceedings of OeNB Workshop No. 7/2006, 246-264. 
Taylor, John. B. (1993), Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice, Carnegie-Rochester 
Conferece Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214. 
Ullrich, K. (2004). Decision-Making of the ECB: Reform and Voting Power, ZEW Discussion 
Paper No. 04–70, ZEW Mannheim. 
Orphanides, Athanasios (2007), Taylor Rules, Finance and Economics Discussion Series of 
the Federal Reserve Board 18, Washington/DC.  
Owen, G. and Shapley, L.S. (1989) Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space, 
International Journal of Game Theory 18, 339-356. 
Widgrén, M. (2008), Does the ECB Suffer from Status Quo Bias?, Vox-Research-based 
policy analysis and commentary from leading economists, 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/949, November 16.-32- 
 


















































Source: Own calculations.  
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Figure 3 - Comparison of the MLE index EB in scenarios without (white) and with an agenda-
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Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 4 - Comparison of the MLE index for Germany in scenarios without (white) and with 
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Source: Own calculations. Countries are ordered according to their preferred interest rates. 
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Source: Own calculations. Scenario without agenda-setter in white, with agenda-setter in grey. 
 
Figure 7 - Distribution of power on month 1: The case of a heterogeneous EB with member 

































Source: Own calculations. Scenario without agenda-setter in white, with agenda-setter in grey. 
 
Figure 8 - Distribution of power in month 1: The case of a heterogeneous EB with member 

































Source: Own calculations. Scenario without agenda-setter in white, with agenda-setter in grey.-
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